Perceptual decision making is an area of research that has received a great deal of attention over the last 10 years or so. In psychology, it has been investigated with a range of approaches, from experimental to theoretical (Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2007; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999 ; P. L. Smith, 1995 ; P. L. Smith & Ratcliff, 2009 ; P. L. Smith, Ratcliff, & Wolfgang, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001) , and it has been studied with combined theoretical and empirical approaches in neuroscience (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; New some, Britten, & Movshon, 1989; Salzman & Newsome, 1994; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Supèr, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001) . In most research to date, the focus has been on the twochoice experimental paradigm (e.g., Rat cliff & Rouder, 1998) . There has also been an accumulat ing body of research that has taken models of processing and extended them to multiplechoice paradigms (Bogacz et al., 2007; McMillen & Holmes, 2006; Usher & Mc Clelland, 2004; Usher, Olami, & McClelland, 2002) . But to this point in time, there have been relatively few com bined experimental and theoretical studies of multiple alternative perceptual decision making. Our aim in this article is to address the lack of such studies by presenting an experiment and comprehensive theoretical analyses. 1 The growing consensus in the perceptualdecision making domain is that only models that assume that evi dence is gradually accumulated over time can account for the full range of experimental data-namely, accuracy and both correct and error reaction time (RT) distributions.
Two variants of this general class are the Wiener diffusion process model (Ratcliff, 1978 (Ratcliff, , 2002 Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000) and the multiple racing diffusion processes model (Ratcliff, 2006 ; P. L. Smith, 2000; Usher & McClelland, 2001 ). In the standard diffu sion process, evidence is accumulated in a single variable toward one of two decision criteria. This model is diffi cult to extend to multiple alternatives, although Laming (1968) and Pike (1966) , for example, have offered quali tative suggestions. The model that seems most natural for the multiplealternative paradigm assumes that evidence is accumulated in separate accumulators, corresponding to the different alternatives. In particular, the model that best exemplifies the set of features we wish to test is the leaky competing accumulator (LCA; Usher & McClel land, 2001) . This model assumes that stochastic accumu lation of information occurs continuously over time, with leakage (decay) and lateral inhibition (competition among accumulators), with the possibility of variability in both starting point and the drift rates driving the accumulation process. The LCA model, however, has been fit to rela tively few experimental data sets.
The general evidence accumulation model has been applied to a number of domains, from neurophysiologi cal data to cognitive tasks such as memory, lexical pro cessing, and absolute identification, to aging and im paired processing, and to consumer decision making (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Brown & Heathcote, 2005 Several sequentialsampling models using racing diffusion processes for multiplealternative decisions were evaluated, using data from two perceptual discrimination experiments. The structures of the models differed on a number of dimensions, including whether there was lateral inhibition between accumulators, whether there was decay in evidence, whether evidence could be negative, and whether there was variability in starting points. Data were collected from a letter discrimination task in which stimulus difficulty and probability of the response alternatives were varied along with number of response alternatives. Modelfitting results ruled out a large number of model classes in favor of a smaller number of specific models, most of which showed a moderate to high degree of mimicking. The bestfitting models had zero to moderate values of decay, had no inhibition, and assumed that the addition of alternatives affected the subprocesses contributing to the nondecisional time, the degree of caution, or the quality of evidence extracted from stimuli.
responses jointly and, so, identify the different sources of noise.
Evidence accumulation models have also been related to physiological measures in humans, using both func tional magnetic resonance imaging (f MRI) and elec troencephalography (EEG). Heekeren et al. (2006) , for example, found evidence for a decision variable existing independently of motor planning and execution. They had participants express their decision about direction of mo tion using two independent motor systems, oculomotor and manual, and found that four brain regions showed an increased BOLD signal to high coherence (relative to low coherence), independent of the motor system used to ex press the decision. Philiastides, Ratcliff, and Sajda (2006) , using a singletrial analysis of EEG data from a face-car discrimination task with human participants, found sup port for a time separation between perceptual processing and decisionmaking processing. This separation suggests that cortical networks could dynamically allocate addi tional processing time for difficult decisions.
In behavioral research in psychology, perceptual deci sion making has been studied using models that make a great deal of contact between theory and data. In par ticular, the sequential sampling framework has been successful in accounting for both RT and accuracy, as well as speed-accuracy tradeoff effects (for reviews, see Luce, 1986; Vickers, Cau drey, & Willson, 1971 ), continuing to be of critical theo retical interest. An exemplar of this particular modeling approach is the diffusion model proposed by Ratcliff (1978) . Using a numerosity judgment task, for example, Ratcliff et al. (1999) showed that the diffusion model could explain how both correct and incorrect decisions are made, how their relative speeds change as a function of experimental conditions, and why RT distributions have their characteristic shapes. Models implementing multiple racing diffusion processes (e.g., Bogacz et al., 2007; Ratcliff et al., 2007; Usher & McClelland, 2001 ) not only extend well to multiple alternative paradigms, but also qualitatively fit twochoice data as well as the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2005) .
The evidence accumulation models have a major ad vantage over static models of decision making, in that they allow for several sources of variability that occur in different components of processing and that are identifi able (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) . For example, there can be variability in perceptual strength (variability in drift rate across trials), in starting points of the process or decision criteria, in the decision process itself (within trial noise), and in the duration of other processes (encoding and response output). The abil ity of these models to identify such variability sources is a major advance because they allow noise in processing to be separated into sources that occur at different points in the stream of processing, from encoding to decision. If our experimental and theoretical work is to be related to physiological measures (i.e., EEG, f MRI, magneto encephalography, or singlecell recording), we need the 2008; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Ditterich, 2006; Gomez, Perea, & Ratcliff, 2007; Mazurek, Roitman, Dit terich, & Shad len, 2003; Niwa & Ditterich, 2008; Rat cliff, Cherian, & Segraves, 2003; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, & Segraves, 2007; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2006; Ratcliff, Thapar, Smith, & McKoon, 2005; Rat cliff & Van Dongen, 2009; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001) . One of the features of models in the evidence accumulation class is that in order for them to successfully account for the full range of experimen tal data, they need to assume that various components of processing vary from trial to trial (Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 1999) . These models can be contrasted with signal de tection theory (SDT; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961) , in which all sources of noise are combined into a single source-namely, variability in perceptual strength. For example, in the class of diffusion process models, the decision process is assumed to be variable, within a trial (withintrial noise) and across trials, in perceptual strength (drift rate) and starting points.
In neuroscience, Hanes and Schall (1996) were the first to convincingly argue that it is possible to relate evidence accumulation models to singlecell recording data. They suggested that rhesus monkeys' saccadic movements were initiated if and only if the neural activity in frontal eye field cells surpassed a (constant) threshold and that RT distribution was a resultant of the stochastic variability in the rate at which neural activity grew toward that thresh old. Following Hanes and Schall's work, neurobiology in the decisionmaking field seems to have adopted the mo tion discrimination paradigm to examine perceptual deci sion making (e.g., Ditterich, 2006; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Heekeren, Marrett, Ruff, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2006; Niwa & Ditterich, 2008; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Salzman & Newsome, 1994; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) . In a standard motion discrimination task, a percentage of dots in a display move coherently, while the remaining dots are shuffled to random positions. Primate or human participants decide in which direction the coherent dots are moving and respond with a saccade to a target or with a keypress.
In several studies, models that assumed accumulation of information toward decision criteria have been applied to experimental data from the motion discrimination task. In some of these studies (Mazurek et al., 2003; Palmer et al., 2005; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002) , joint RT and ac curacy were collected, but the models were either not fit to the full range of experimental data or fit relatively poorly. Because the models were not successfully fit to the range of behavioral data, it is not possible to determine whether the models need the various sources of variability in pro cessing to account for the full range of data. Nevertheless, some of the models used only withintrial noise. Models in Ditterich (2006) , Niwa and Ditterich (2008) , and Ratcliff and McKoon (2008) , on the other hand, attempted to fit accuracy and RT distributions for both correct and error reported in what follows all assume equal levels of noise for all accumulators.
Parenthetically, by defining MRT in terms of the signal tonoise ratio a/c (drift rate over the square root of the diffusion coefficient), optimal performance is achieved when 
where h * n21 is the expected value of the (n21)th standard normal order statistic and ER is the error rate (cf. McMil len & Holmes, 2006, Equation 37 ).
Models
Sequentialsampling models have been developed and successfully applied to cognitive tasks, but they usually involve two alternatives. For this project, we investigated multiplealternative extensions for some members of the sequentialsampling family of models. In 2004, Ratcliff and Smith reported an evaluation of four widely used sequentialsampling models: the Wiener diffusion model (Laming, 1968; Link, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978 Ratcliff, , 1981 Ratcliff, , 1985 Ratcliff, , 1988a , the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) diffusion model (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1992 , 1993 P. L. Smith, 2000) , Vickers's accumulator model (LaBerge, 1962; P. L. Smith & Vickers, 1988; Vickers, 1970) , and the Poisson coun ter model (P. L. Smith & Van Zandt, 2000; Townsend & Ashby, 1983) . Although the Wiener diffusion process model produced the best fits to the twochoice RT data from three experiments against which these four mod els were tested, an extension of this model to multiple alternative paradigms is not straightforward. However, Ratcliff and Smith also reported that three other models, whose architectures are suitable to multiple alternatives, mimicked the Wiener diffusion process model and pro duced fits almost as good as that of the Wiener diffusion process model. These models were Usher and McClel land's (2001) LCA model and two other models assuming racing diffusion processes, either with absolute stopping criteria and decay or with relative stopping criteria (i.e., max vs. next; for reports of similar results, see Ratcliff, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2005) . Usher and McClelland's (2001) LCA model assumes that stochastic accumulation of information occurs con tinuously over time, with leakage (decay) and lateral in hibition. There is one accumulator implementing a diffu sion process for each response alternative, and a response is made when an accumulator reaches its respective deci sion criterion (see Figure 1) . The rate at which one ac cumulator approaches its criterion is determined by the input from the stimulus (ρ), the decay (κ), and the lateral inhibition (β). Inhibition increases as the amount of in formation increases in the other accumulators, and the ability to separate different sources of variability (e.g., Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009) .
Our aim in this article is to present experiments in which the number of alternatives was manipulated along with the difficulty of the decision. This allows us to test whether the data support one or many of a range of pos sible model features. What we aim to learn about percep tual decision making from this study is whether these vari ous architectural features are necessary. In particular, is lateral inhibition between alternatives needed? Does the evidence in the accumulators decay the more evidence is accumulated? In addition, the modeling will allow us to determine which sources of variability play an important role in processing.
We present empirical data from a multiplealternative paradigm and report tests of a number of racing diffu sion process models that differ on a number of dimen sions, with the various combinations of these dimensions leading to 384 possible models. We exclude most of them in preliminary analyses and report fitting details of 16 models. More specifically, we report data collected from two experiments involving a letter discrimination task in which two, three, or four response alternatives were used. The difficulty of the decision was manipulated in the first experiment by changing the discriminability of the stimuli and, in the second, by varying the proportion of stimuli corresponding to the different responses. Subsequently, we describe what properties were found in the bestfitting models and examine the impact of increasing the number of alternatives on the two manipulations (difficulty and proportion).
Hick's Law
In early investigations of the impact of increasing the number of alternatives, Hick (1952) and Hyman (1953) described evidence that showed that mean reaction time (MRT) should increase with number of alternatives. If the stimuli have equal probability, this is currently viewed as a wellestablished fact (e.g., Luce, 1986) . Hick further noted that this relationship was best fit by MRT 5 A 1 B log(n 1 1).
(
Several studies following Hick's (1952) article pre sented results that conformed to Equation 1 or to a vari ant, replacing (n 1 1) with n, both commonly referred to as Hick's law or as the Hick-Hyman law (see Welford, 1980, pp. 73-77 , for a survey of the original Hick's law and variants). Models of the type we evaluated are capable of producing MRTs that conform to Hick's law. In free response protocols, for example, McMillen and Holmes (2006) showed that leaky accumulator (LA) models with absolute threshold implementations perform nearly op timally (by minimizing the decision time for a predeter mined level of accuracy) for moderate (and approximately equal) values of decay and inhibition and error rates larger than 10%. Under these circumstances, predicted MRTs conform to Hick's law, and this correspondence is found so long as all accumulators in the model receive equal levels of noise (see also Bogacz et al., 2007) . The models ous decay of some proportion of the accumulated signal inherently bounds the sensitivity of the decision stage.
2. Competing versus independent accumulation. For β . 0 in Equation 3, accumulation of evidence to any accumulator is inhibited in proportion to the amount of evidence accumulated at this point by its competitors. The assumption that one alternative influences the accumula tion of evidence for competing alternatives is a plausible processing assumption discussed by Usher and McClel land (2001) , who noted that the use of lateral inhibition enables the emulation of relativeevidence diffusion processes while using an absolute threshold criterion, al lowing the model to be applied equivalently to two and multiplechoice paradigms (p. 552).
3. Starting-point variability versus identical starting points. Adding variability in starting points allows random initial biases toward one of the alternatives (e.g., Laming, 1968) , making it a crucial feature in accounting for fast error responses in the data. Variability in starting point can be modeled in two ways. In its simplest form, each accumulator starts from a random point, drawn from a uniform distribu tion between 0 and a limit determined by a free parameter (s sp ). In an alternative form, starting points are negatively correlated, as in Ratcliff et al. (2007) . In the latter case, a number x is randomly selected from a uniform distribu tion between 0 and s sp /2; one accumulator is set to start at (s sp /2 1 x), and the other accumulators start at (s sp /2 2 x).
4. Unbounded versus bounded evidence accumulation. In racing accumulator models, it is often assumed that activity cannot fall below zero. This assumption is usu ally justified by appeal to neural plausibility, but from a mathematical point of view, one could relax the bounded evidence accumulation assumption by allowing accumu lators to take on negative values.
5. One nondecisional-component parameter or one parameter for each number of alternatives. As was noted above, all the models we considered assumed that the durations of all components of processing other than the decision component are combined into a single random variable that varies across trials. This nondecisional com ponent is commonly assumed to include encoding and motorresponse times. As more alternatives are added, it is possible that some motor component, such as motor preparation, slows down. Thus, the nondecisional compo nent can be assumed to differ with number of alternatives (i.e., two, three, or four alternatives), resulting in three additional free parameters in the model. Or it can be the same across number of alternatives, adding a single free parameter to the model. 6. One versus three decision criterion parameters. Models can have either one single value for all the deci sion criteria for all numbers of alternatives or different parameters, one for each number of alternatives involved in the decision. Psychologically, it is plausible to have a higher degree of caution in conditions involving higher numbers of alternatives.
7. Target-foil versus accumulator-specific input strength parameters. Two assumptions regarding input strength parameters can be made. First, the letter corre size of decay increases as information in the accumulator increases. Accuracy and RT are modeled simultaneously, and the growth of evidence in the accumulators is gov erned by Laming (1968) and Ratcliff et al. (1999) . In all the racing diffusion process models we considered, nondecisional components (e.g., stimulus encoding and motor response processes) are combined into a single random variable, t er , which is assumed to vary across tri als. In the models, this nondecisional component takes values from a rectangular distribution with mean T er and range s t , and the predicted MRT is the mean time it takes the decision process to terminate plus the nondecisional component.
Models for fitting the data. There are 384 racing dif fusion process models we could produce from all possible combinations of the assumptions we presented above. We summarize the various theoretical options below (which have all been used or proposed previously in the litera ture), followed by brief discussions about the theoretical issues of process or representation associated with them within the framework of the LCA model.
1. Decaying versus nondecaying accumulation. For κ . 0 in Equation 3, evidence in any accumulator decays by an amount proportional to the amount of evidence in it. The presence or absence of decay is chiefly an architectural issue. As was reported in P. L. Smith (1995) , the spontane 4. Thirty-six input strength parameters: one set of nine input strength parameters as in (2) for each of the four possible target response letters, akin to (3).
ExPEriMEnTs 1 and 2
We collected data using a multiplealternative letter discrimination task, with number of alternatives rang ing from two to four across blocks. Participants saw one letter in each trial, embedded in static background noise and presented for up to 160 msec, and indicated their response by depressing the corresponding key.
We chose two manipulations: perceptual difficulty (Ex periment 1) and target frequency (Experiment 2). These were chosen because we wanted to have manipulations of different cognitive processes that could lead to changes in both accuracy and RT in a relatively wide range, which, individually, could potentially be captured by a single parameter in the models. These manipulations have been successfully used to test models, and their effects have been discussed in the literature for quite some time (e.g., Hyman, 1953, and Swensson, 1972 , for stimulus fre quency and perceptual difficulty, respectively). In short, highquality stimuli are expected to have an advantage over lowquality stimuli, and highprobability stimuli are expected to have an advantage over lowprobability stim uli (Thomas, 2006) . Specifically, perceptual difficulty was chosen because task difficulty is also affected by the manipulation of num ber of alternatives. Thus, it was important to determine which factors were responsible for behavioral changes caused by an increase in task difficulty due both to the stimulus manipulation and to the manipulation of the number of alternatives. Target frequency has been used in studies of participants' bias, with bias toward one response producing increased accuracy and shorter RTs. With this manipulation, we could investigate whether the effect of adding alternatives interacts with that of bias.
Method Participants
Five Ohio State University undergraduate students took part in the study. All the participants reported normal or correctedtonormal vi sion. Each participant ran a series of 45 to 50min sessions, for each of which they were compensated $10. Participants 1-3 participated in both experiments; Participants 1 and 3 ran Experiment 1 (four sessions) followed by Experiment 2 (three sessions), whereas Par ticipant 2 ran the reverse order (six sessions in Experiment 2 and five sessions in Experiment 1). Participant 4 ran only Experiment 1 (five sessions), and Participant 5 ran only Experiment 2 (six sessions).
apparatus and Procedure
The experiments were run on personal computers running the Linux operating system with a customized realtime system. Com puters were connected to a 17in. monitor with a resolution of 640 3 480 pixels and a standard 102key keyboard, whose numeric keypad was altered to the arrangement shown in Figure 3 .
We chose P, Y, J, and L as stimulus letters on the basis of work by Gilmore, Hersh, Caramazza, and Griffin (1979) . Gilmore et al. used a letter discrimination task to determine the frequency with which (capital) letters of the alphabet were confused with each other. We considered as stimulus candidates sets of four letters that were sponding to the correct alternative in each trial is modeled by one (target) input strength, and the other letter alterna tives have another (foil), identical input strength (see Fig  ure 2 ). Second, each letter alternative in a letter discrimi nation task can use a separate input strength parameter so that accumulators are assigned to specific letters. In all cases, it is assumed that the input strength parameters add to 1 (cf. Usher & McClelland, 2001 ).
In addition, input strength parameters can be assumed to be the same or to differ across number of alternatives, leading to one or three sets of target-foil pairs of param eters or one or three sets of four letterspecific param eters. Input strength can also be assumed to vary across difficulty (or bias) levels, multiplying the number of input strength parameters by three. These assumptions are sum marized below.
1. Three input strength parameters: one for targets in two alternatives (with the competitor's strength defined as the unit minus the target input strength); a second for tar gets in three alternatives (with the two competitors equally sharing the equivalent of the unit minus the target input strength); and a third for targets in four alternatives (with the three competitors equally sharing the equivalent of the unit minus the target input strength). This assumption was included to make sure that stimulus difficulty had a stronger effect on the fit measures than did the number of alternatives.
2. Nine input strength parameters: as in (1), but allow ing for a different parameter in each level of difficulty (or bias) within each number of alternatives. That is, there are three target parameters among two alternatives-one for easy trials, a second for mediumdifficulty trials, and a third for difficult trials-as well as three target parameters among three alternatives and three other target parameters among four alternatives.
3. Twelve input strength parameters: one set of three input strength parameters as in (1) for each of the four possible target response letters. For example, among two alternative trials, one set of parameters modeled trials on which P was the target response, and another set modeled trials on which L was the target response. the participants released the "5" key in less than 160 msec, the stimu lus was taken off the screen immediately after the "5" key release; otherwise, the stimulus was on for 160 msec. RT was measured from stimulus onset to release of the "5" key, and the choice of response key was also recorded. The participants received a "Too Slow" feed back message every time they took longer than 225 msec to depress a response key after releasing the "5" key. In order to discourage the participants from anticipating their responses, they were given a "Too Fast" warning message for every release occurring less than 100 msec after stimulus onset. In Experiment 2, in which anticipatory responses might occur more often, the "Too Fast" message was displayed for releases faster than 250, 300, and 350 msec for two, three, and four alternative blocks, respectively.
RT was measured from stimulus onset to the release of a key, prior to movement to any of the equally spaced response keys (cf. Figure 3 ) indicating the choice. This contrasts with Merkel's 10 alternative design (in Hick, 1952) , in which participants rested their 10 fingers on a series of 10 keys and indicated their response by depressing a key with its corresponding finger. This use of 10 keys provides no safeguard against the possibility that a participant may be able to hit keys more quickly with some fingers than with others (although the different speeds associated with different fingers may be small).
In short, the combination of very short postkeyrelease movements, the feedback triggered by relatively long postkeyrelease times, and the removal of stimulus from the display after key release (when ap plicable-viz., responses shorter than 160 msec) were safeguards in place to prevent decision processes from occurring past our recorded decision times (see G. A. Smith & Carew, 1987 , for possible partici pants' strategies that may distort the measurement of RT in a paradigm similar to ours). It is nevertheless possible that, in our design, some cognitive processes may still be taking place postkeyrelease (e.g., selfmonitoring), but we know of no evidence to suggest that these processes do not occur when responses are made by keypress as well or that they are part of the decision processes we model. confused with one another less than 2.5% of the time, did not sound alike, and used about the same number of pixels on the computer monitor. We imposed these restrictions so that models with targetfoil input strength parameters were plausible models (see the Model Fitting section). Pilot runs with Z, H, F, and Y, for example, showed that participants were quicker to respond to Z than to other letters. In subsequent debriefing, the participants reported to be first look ing for the diagonal in the letter Z, and then for the angle atop the letter Y in order to make their response. If those searches failed, they reported deciding between H and F. No similar strategy was reported for the set P, Y, J, L.
In both experiments, a stimulus display was constructed by writing a white letter on a black background and flipping a proportion of the pixels on the screen from black to white and vice versa (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) . We informed the participants that they would per form a simple decision task with multiple alternatives and that they were to identify an (approximately 90 3 90 pixel) letter appearing in a 320 3 200 pixel window in the center of the screen. The stimulus was displayed after the participants depressed the middle key, "5," and they used the same finger, either the index finger or the middle finger of their right hand, to press the response key corresponding to the let ter. The stimulus remained on the screen for up to 160 msec. That is, if 
design
Two 3 3 3 designs, detailed below, were used. In each experiment, a session was composed of 36 blocks of 60 trials each. Data from entire sessions were left out of the analyses when the participants were still familiarizing themselves with the tasks and procedures. Participants 1 and 3 previously ran some pilot sessions; hence, none Although the mapping from letter to response key did not change across trials, at the start of each trial, the response key arrangement was presented on the screen (see Figure 3 ), simply as a reminder for the participants. In blocks with fewer than four alternatives, a pound sign replaced unused alternatives. Figure 4 illustrates the timeline of a trial. the participants, mean correct RT increased and accuracy decreased as either number of alternatives or difficulty increased (see Table 1 and Figure 6 ).
Plotting quantile RTs versus quantile RTs (Q-Q plots), averaged across participants, showed approximately linear relationships between conditions (cf. Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) , whether across difficulty levels (Figure 7 ) or across number of alternatives (Figure 8 ). Linearity in Q-Q plots implies invariance in distribution shape between condi tions. The closer the Q-Q line is to the x 5 y line, the closer to identical the distributions; a line (approximately) parallel to and above x 5 y (i.e., slope around the unit) implies a shift of the entire distribution in the y condition relative to the x condition (see, e.g., Figure 7 , two alterna tives, error responses, medium vs. difficult).
As a function of difficulty, Q-Q lines were linear, but the slopes were greater than the unity-1.08, on averageindicating that the increase in MRT as difficulty increased was due to RT distributions spreading (see Figure 7 ). Q-Q plots across number of alternatives showed shifts of the entire RT distribution (although slopes did not deviate much from the mean, 0.98), for both correct and error responses, as the number of alternatives increased (i.e., RTs became longer; see Figure 8 ). This shift was more prominent when number of alternatives increased from two to three than when it increased from three to four-as measured by the average difference over the five quantile RT points, approximately 45 and 23 msec (averaged over correct and error responses), respectively. (The individual analysis does not alter the interpretation of the group data presented above and, thus, is not shown.)
Error responses were faster than correct responses for two alternatives, but not for three or four alternatives. For two alternatives, averaging across difficulty conditions, the .9quantile point for error responses was only about 5 msec slower than that for correct responses, whereas the .1quantile point was about 22 msec faster. For three and four alternatives, there was almost no difference between error and correct responses in the .1quantile point (about 25 and 5 msec, respectively), unlike typical twochoice results (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000; Thapar, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2003) , whereas error responses were slower than correct responses in the .9quantile point (by about 22 and 29 msec, respectively).
Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, extremely fast and slow responses were eliminated from analyses, using cutoffs. Averaged of their sessions were excluded from our analyses. Participant 2's first two sessions in Experiment 2 and first session in Experiment 1 were excluded. Participant 4's initial session was also excluded, as well as Participant 5's initial three sessions.
Experiment 1: difficulty. In Experiment 1, the factors were dif ficulty (within blocks) and number of alternatives (across blocks). In each session there were 12 two alternative blocks, 12 three alternative blocks, and 12 fouralternative blocks, randomly intermixed. In each block, 20 easy trials, 20 medium trials, and 20 difficult trials (i.e., respectively flipping 28.5%, 32.1%, or 36.1% of the pixels from the white letter written on a black background from black to white and vice versa) were presented, and the participants were informed of the equal proportions of the different levels of difficulty.
Experiment 2: Proportion. In Experiment 2, the factors were stimulus proportion (across blocks) and number of alternatives (across blocks). There were three conditions in which one let ter was chosen to be the highproportion alternative (vs. the other lowproportion letters): no, low, and highbias conditions. Spe cifically, the proportions were 30:30, 45:15, and 51:9 for the no, low, and highbias conditions in twoalternative blocks; 20:20:20, 36:12:12, and 45:8:7 for the no, low, and highbias conditions in three alternative blocks; and 15:15:15:15, 30:10:10:10, and 40:7:7:6 for the no, low, and highbias conditions in fouralternative blocks. All the letters had an equal number of trials as the highproportion stimulus. Stimulus difficulty was held constant: 31.6% of the pixels from the white letter written on a black background were flipped from black to white and vice versa on all the trials. In a session, there were 12 nobias blocks, 12 lowbias blocks, and 12 highbias blocks. Thus, among fouralternative blocks, each letter was the highbias target once. Before each block, the participants were told how many times each alternative would appear in that block. We instructed the participants to use that information to their advantage, but not to anticipate their responses.
results
In this section, we present the data from the two experi ments. In the immediately following section, we present the model fits to the data. Figure 5 shows mean correct RTs plotted as a function of number of alternatives averaged over Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2 (right panel). The results showed an increase in mean correct RT that is consistent with Hick's law. 2 However, this relationship will not allow discrimination among the models because most will be able to predict this pattern. Slight decreases in accuracy with an increase in number of alternatives were also ob served (see below), consistent with previous reports (e.g., Lacouture & Marley, 1995) .
number of alternatives and Hick's Law

Experiment 1
Extremely fast and slow responses were eliminated from analyses using cutoffs. The lower cutoff was chosen to be the point below which the participants performed at chance level. The upper cutoff was chosen to eliminate very slow outliers (e.g., responses 200 msec or slower than the next fastest response) or belowchance slow responses. Averaged over participants, in Experiment 1, the mean lower cutoffs were 253, 285, and 298 msec, whereas the mean upper cutoffs were 787, 900, and 950 msec, for two, three, and four alternatives, respectively. 3 Excluding data points in this way eliminated approximately 0.9% of the data. The results from Experiment 1 showed that, for all The Q-Q plots for Experiment 2 ( Figure 10 ) were linear, as in Experiment 1, and showed little change in the shape of RT distributions as bias level increased (for both cor rect and error responses). They also showed a larger shift of the entire correct RT distribution when bias increased from low to high than when bias increased from none to low (approximately 15 and 8 msec, respectively, averaged across number of alternatives). As in Experiment 1, fast error responses were obtained for two alternatives, but not for three or four alternatives. over participants, in Experiment 2, the mean lower cutoffs were 213, 265, and 288 msec, whereas the mean upper cut offs were 688, 713, and 730 msec for two, three, and four alternatives, respectively. 4 Excluding data points in this way eliminated approximately 2.8% of the data. Overall, the re sults from Experiment 2 showed that mean correct RTs to highproportion stimuli decreased and accuracy increased as blocks became more biased. Also as in Experiment 1, mean correct RT increased and accuracy decreased as num ber of alternatives increased (see Table 2 and Figure 9 ). was little change in their shapes. In short, the increase of both bias and number of alternatives simply shifted the RT distributions.
MOdELing anaLysis
There were 384 possible models from the combinations of the characteristics we presented earlier. To reduce this number to a more manageable number, we took two steps: Q-Q plots of no bias versus low bias and low bias ver sus high bias (Figure 11 ) showed a shift of the entire RT distribution, for both correct and error responses, as the number of alternatives increased and RTs became longer. This shift was less prominent when number of alternatives increased from three to four than when it increased from two to three (respectively, approximately 26 and 55 msec, averaged over correct and error responses). Regardless of the magnitude of the shift in RT distributions, there slight increase in leading edge, and these changes are stronger for larger values of decay.
2. Inhibition. Small increases in inhibition cause an increase in accuracy and an increase in spread of the RT distribution with negligible changes in the leading edge of RT distributions. When inhibition was high, change in the spread of the RT distribution was small for twochoice con ditions but larger for three and fourchoice conditions. First, by simulation, we evaluated the impact of each model parameter on the model's predictions (even though these simulations are susceptible to parameter interaction effects); and second, we performed preliminary tests with the data from Experiment 1. On the basis of the first step, we found the following.
1. Decay. As decay increases, accuracy increases and spread of RT distributions increases, accompanied by terion (BIC) values were much higher than the BIC values for alternative models, due to the number of parameters.
9. Decision criterion, input strength, and decay. We also note that increasing the value of the decision criterion, re ducing the input strength value, or increasing decay leads to similar slowing of RT distributions.
We were able to rule out several models because neither did they qualitatively fit the data from Experiment 1 nor were their BIC values competitive.
1. Models with inhibition. We found that the extra parameter representing mutual lateral inhibition wors ened the BIC estimates without producing qualitatively better fits, relative to the models that did not have such inhibition.
2. Models with noncorrelated, nonidentical starting points. We found that models with identical or negatively correlated starting points produced competitive BIC esti mates, but models with random starting points produced higher BIC estimates.
3. Models that allowed negative evidence. These mod els produced poorer qualitative fits than did the models with nonnegative evidence only.
4. Models with 3 (target/foil, across number of alternatives) or 12 (one for each of the four letters, across number of alternatives) input strength parameters. These models assumed that the experimental difficulty manipulations would be absorbed by parameters other than the input strength parameters, and, hence, they were ruled out on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
5. Models with 36 (one for each of the four letters, across number of alternatives and difficulty conditions) input strength parameters. These variants did not produce competitive BIC estimates, due to the much larger number of parameters than for the models with nine input strength parameters (target/foil, across number of alternatives and difficulty conditions). Because our choice of letter alter natives was designed to use a set of letters that produced about the same confusability (cf. Gilmore et al., 1979) , the exclusion of these models (which modeled accumulation rates for each specific letter separately) does not result in a loss of generality.
Excluding these least competitive classes of models reduced the number of model variants to 16, involving the following differences: three versus one nondecisional component, three versus one decision criterion, decaying versus nondecaying accumulation, and identical versus dif ferent starting points (we used negatively correlated start ing points for the data in Experiment 1 and biased starting points for the data in Experiment 2; in the latter case, target starting points will be closer to criterion threshold than will the starting points of competing accumulators in the same proportion as the response alternative bias). Table 3 lists the structure of all the models tested. Note that all the LA vari ants use noncompeting racing processes with decay, which are dual diffusion models, as in Ratcliff et al. (2007) .
Model Fitting
We pooled each participant's data across sessions, pro vided that the sessionbysession data showed relatively stable performance, as measured by MRT and accuracy.
3. Decay and inhibition. When decay and inhibition have the same nonzero value (i.e., are balanced), almost identical leading edges are observed in the RT distribu tions, when compared with zero values of decay and inhi bition. Nonzero values of decay and inhibition also lead to RT distributions with slightly larger spread than those obtained with zero values of decay and inhibition.
4. Starting point. Adding relatively small amounts of variability to starting points (i.e., one eighth or one fourth of the range from 0 to threshold) led to slight leftward shifts of the RT distributions. For negatively correlated starting points, a slight decrease in accuracy was observed, whereas no clear pattern was observed for random starting points.
Negative evidence versus nonnegative-only evidence.
Negatively unbounded accumulation of evidence led to an increase in accuracy and a slight increase in the spread of the RT distributions, when compared with nonnegative only accumulation.
6. Number of nondecisional components. When nonde cisional components are ordered such that nondecisional time for two alternatives is shorter than that for three alter natives, which in turn is shorter than that for four alterna tives, reducing the number of nondecisional components from three to one (estimated in between the time for two and three alternatives) caused a rightward shift in the two choice RT distributions and a leftward shift in the three and fourchoice distributions.
7. Decision criterion. By itself, increasing the number of decision criteria from one (identical criteria for two, three, and four alternatives) to three (different criteria for two, three, and four alternatives) causes changes in both accuracy and RT distributions that are not readily inter pretable unless the three criteria are ordered such that the criterion threshold for two alternatives is lower than that for three alternatives, which in turn is lower than that for four alternatives. When that holds, accuracy will decrease, and RT distributions will have a slightly larger spread as number of alternatives increases.
8. Input strength. Having 3 or 12 input strength param eters with "average" values did not allow the models to capture changes in difficulty conditions. The advantage of having 12 parameters-the preferred structure to fit our data-over 3 was the ability to model the accumula tion of each letter alternative individually. Having 36 input strength parameters also allowed small changes in RT distributions and accuracy to be modeled as a function of specific letters, but such models' Bayesian information cri fit measures were computed for each model and for each participant. As in the preliminary tests, the main statistic we used in the minimization routines to adjust the models' param eters in search of the best fit was BIC. We checked pa rameter estimates obtained from minimization with BIC against parameter estimates obtained from minimization with chisquare (χ 2 ) and verified that these estimates were consistent. Hence, interpretation of parameter estimates of any model was not BIC specific. We used BIC to evalu Specifically, the data from initial sessions up to session i were removed from the analyses if the data from session i11 showed that responses were faster by more than 10% on average or more accurate by more than 0.1 percentage point in any condition.
RT data were separated into error and correct RTs, and error and correct RT distributions were approximated by five quantiles, evenly spaced between .1 and .9. Each model was simultaneously fit to error and correct RT dis tributions from each individual participant. Goodnessof Since our minimization routine was based on five quantile RTs for correct responses and five for error responses, creating six data bins for each case, the BIC statistic is defined by
where p i and π i are the proportions of observed and pre dicted data in the ith bin, N is the number of observations ate how well the models fit the data because we needed to compare nonnested models with different numbers of parameters, a situation for which χ 2 ranking is inadequate. In addition, comparing models using their BIC estimates can be done in a statistically meaningful and simple way, as described by Raftery (1995) . BIC provides a penalty for the number of parameters in a model, and it penalizes models for complexity of their functional form (cf. Schwarz, 1978; Wasserman, 2000) . iteration. The first iteration was based on a set of starting parameters, and the iterations that followed were based on the SIMPLEX adjustments to that set of starting pa rameters. The last iteration in a (fitting) run produced an optimal set of parameters, based on the minimum BIC (or χ 2 ) value obtained. In an attempt to avoid local min ima, we used three startingparameter sets, each of which was used to start a different serial chain of four SIMPLEX fits (in which each optimal set of parameters produced by a run was used as the starting set of parameters for in the condition, and M is the number of free parameters in the model.
The models were fit to data using the SIMPLEX fit ting method (Nelder & Mead, 1965) . Because there is no known explicit solution for Equation 3, predictions from the models were obtained by simulation. We used Monte Carlo methods that generated 20,000 simulations of the decision process to compute the probabilities of the re sponses and their respective RT distributions. In the fit ting method, each 20,000 simulations represented one Table 6 ). Model variant labels abbreviate the mod els' structure: A, accumulator (without decay); LA, leaky accumulator (with decay); T, t er ; C, criterion; cS, correlated starting point; eS, equal starting point. where p i and π i are the proportions of observed and pre dicted data in the ith bin, N is the number of observations in the condition, and M is the number of free parameters in the model. Parenthetically, we note that, unlike BIC estimates, AIC estimates yield no ties in ranking between two models. That is, if a model produces a lower AIC estimate than does another model, the former is deemed statistically superior to the latter regardless of the magnitude of the difference (e.g., Akaike, 1974) . Table 5 shows the ranking of the six remaining models according to both BIC and AIC. Inspec tion of that table shows agreement between BIC and AIC for the two bestfitting models for all 4 participants and for the three bestfitting models for Participants 1 and 3. On the basis of this agreement, we proceed to examine the fits of the three bestfitting models in Experiment 1, A(3T, 1C, eS), LA(3T, 1C, eS), and A(3T, 3C, eS). Table 6 shows mean parameter estimates for the three bestfitting models. Inspection of that table shows that, for all three of these models, (1) the change in T er was much larger going from two to three alternatives than going from three to four alternatives, and that (2) input strength estimates decreased with increased difficulty level. The T er increases across number of alternatives were almost half as large for model A(3T, 3C, eS) than for the two other models (both with only one decision cri terion parameter). Specifically, from two to three alter natives, there was about a 30 versus 40msec increase; from three to four alternatives, there was about a 10 ver sus 20msec increase. Both magnitudes of increase are nearly linear with the logarithm of number of alterna tives, and so is the increase in criterion threshold esti mates for model A (3T, 3C, eS) . In comparison, mean pa rameter estimates for competitive models with only one nondecisional parameter [e.g., A(1T, 3C, eS) in Table 7 ] also show that input strength estimates decreased with the proceeding run; cf. Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) . The minimum BIC value among the values produced by these three chains is the value we report.
Best-Fitting Models
Sixteen models were fitted to the data from both Exper iment 1 and Experiment 2. Table 4 shows the BIC values and their respective rankings for Experiment 1, which are data for the difficulty manipulation. Ties were awarded between BIC values that did not differ by more than 10 points; thus, one model was ranked over another only if there was very strong support ( p . .99) for that model, in accord with Raftery (1995, Table 6) .
Inspection of Table 4 shows that models with both one nondecisional component and one decision criterion were consistently outranked by most other models, so we eliminated models of these two types from contention. Among the 12 remaining models, models with negatively correlated starting points were consistently outranked by models with identical starting points. Thus, we were left with 6 competitive models to explain the data from Ex periment 1, among which the main differences were num ber of parameters modeling the nondecisional component (three vs. one) and decision criterion (three vs. one).
To make sure our selection of the bestfitting model(s) would not be specific to the goodnessoffit measure we used (viz., BIC), we refit these models to the participants' data by means of a corrected Akaike information criterion (AIC; cf. Hurvich & Tsai, 1989 , AIC c ). Our AIC statistic was defined by the following equation, which corresponds to Akaike's original description (e.g., Akaike, 1974 ) plus a bias adjustment term: Note-Average of the parameter estimates across all 4 participants. T n er , nondecision time (in seconds) for the corresponding n number of alterna tives; s t , range of variability in t er ; c n , criterion for the corresponding n number of alternatives; σ, SD in Gaussian noise added to the accumulation process; ρ n λ , input strength at the λ level of difficulty (e, easy; m, medium; d, difficult) for the corresponding n number of alternatives. Model variant labels abbreviate the models' structure: A, accumulator (without decay); LA, leaky accumulator (with decay); T, t er ; C, criterion; eS, equal starting point. Note-Average of the parameter estimates across all 4 participants. T er , nondecision time (in seconds) for any number of alterna tives; s t , range of variability in t er ; c n , criterion for the corresponding n number of alternatives; σ, SD in Gaussian noise added to the accumulation process; ρ n λ , input strength at the λ level of difficulty (e, easy; m, medium; d, difficult) for the corresponding n number of alternatives. Model variant labels abbreviate the models' structure: A, accumulator (without decay); LA, leaky accumulator (with decay); T, t er ; C, criterion; eS, equal starting point. average, two standard deviations from the mean equaled approximately 0.023. Hence, differences between input strengths that were greater than 0.045 were deemed signif icant differences. Across number of alternatives, the only significant differences observed across all three models is the decrease in input strength estimates going from two to three alternatives in the difficulty condition. In addition, for model A (3T, 3C, eS) , the increase in criterion estimates across number of alternatives is also nearly logarithmic.
To illustrate the fits, we plotted the data sets of all 4 participants with predictions-using BIC parameter estimates-from model A (3T, 1C, eS) , the bestfitting increased difficulty level and that the increase in thresh old criterion is nearly linear with the logarithm of num ber of alternatives.
With an increase in the number of alternatives, input strength parameter estimates decreased at times and in creased at other times. To check how significant these changes were, we generated 25 pseudodatasets with 2,160 data points per condition, using average parameter estimates from model A (3T, 1C, eS) , and then fit model A (3T, 1C, eS) to each of these data sets (see Table 6 ). The standard deviation of the mean input strength parameter estimates ranged from about 0.009 to about 0.015. On Figure 14 and from Participants 3 and 4 with predictions from model A(3T, 3C, eS) in Figure 15 . On the basis of goodness of fit alone, we believe we can not decide among competitive models that have the ability to mimic one another, because small differences in data may rank order them differently. Table 8 shows the BIC values and their respective rank ings for Experiment 2, which involve the proportion ma nipulation. Inspection of that table shows individual dif ferences: The models that best fit Participant 5's data were different from those that best fit the data of Participants 1-3. Specifically, the competitive models for the first 3 partici pants were models with three nondecisional parameters and model for Participants 1-3 (see Figures 12 and 13) . Pre dictions of all three bestfitting models were very similar; hence, figures plotting their predictions were not eas ily distinguishable by visual inspection. Models with a decay parameter, for example, produced nearly as good fits as those without it, with decision criterion estimates 10%-30% lower than those for models with no decay (cf. Table 6 ). In addition, the two models with one nondeci sional parameter (i.e., A[1T, 3C, eS] and LA[1T, 3C, eS]) produced visually similar prediction plots as well, despite their slightly worse (quantitative) fit results. To illus trate the fits of the bestfitting models, we plotted data from Participants 1 and 2 with predictions from model Table 9 ; for a comparison with low vs. highfrequency tar gets, see the Appendix). Because the main manipulation in Experiment 2 involved proportion of stimuli, it may be expected that evidence parameters (i.e., input strength) do not change and that decision parameters (i.e., decision criterion) do. We could have constrained all the models that way. Rather, we decided to let the fits confirm or dis confirm this expectation, allowing both decision and input strength parameters to change across level of bias in some models (e.g., model LA[1T, 3C, eS] ). If input strength pa rameters were estimated to be about the same values, this would allow us to constrain them to be equal. Instead, we found that decision criterion parameter estimates did not one criterion parameter, whereas Participant 5's data were better fit by models with one nondecisional parameter and one criterion parameter. For all the participants, models with equal starting points outranked models with biased starting points. Parenthetically, we did not repeat model analyses with AIC, because doing so in Experiment 1 did not alter the selection of the bestfitting models.
LA(3T, 1C, eS) in
The bestfitting model was model A(3T, 1C, eS) for Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the fits with plots of the data sets of all 4 participants with predictions from their respec tive bestfitting models (i.e., either A[3T, 1C, eS] or A[1T, 1C, eS]). As was the case in Experiment 1, predictions of all four bestfitting models were very similar, and, hence, their predictions were not easily distinguishable by visual inspection only. Models with decay (e.g., values around 0.5) produced fits similar to those for models without decay, with criterion estimates about 15% lower. differ much when allowed to vary across bias conditions, whereas input strength estimates differed.
This increase in target input strength estimates when target frequency is higher than distractor frequency can be interpreted as a shift in drift criterion (Gomez et al., 2007; Ratcliff, 1985; Ratcliff et al., 1999) . This shift can be psychologically interpreted as a shift on the input strength dimension analogous to a change in criterion in SDT (see Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008, Figure 3 ). In our case, there was a small shift in drift criterion from no bias to low bias and a larger shift from low bias to high bias. Addition of alternatives, on average, did not cause significant changes For Experiment 1, the bestfitting models account for data with either three nondecisional parameters or three decision criteria (or both), one for each difficulty level. For Experiment 2, the bestfitting models have either one or three nondecisional parameters, but they need only one decision criterion parameter with the same value for each accumulator for two, three, and four alternatives.
In both experiments, the quality of fits for the best fitting models cannot be discriminated by eye. These best fitting models are all capable of fitting correct RT distri butions well, but all miss the relatively short leading edges for error RT distributions obtained with two alternatives in both experiments. This mimicking among competitive models is well known (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1980) , and perhaps the best way to address the problem within this class of models would be to apply the models to a wider range of data and experimental paradigms (such as tasks with deadlines or response signal procedures), as suggested previously by Ratcliff (1988b) .
The main architectural differences among the three bestfitting models for the perceptual difficulty manipula tion involve the decay and the number of decision criterion parameters as a function of the number of alternatives. Models with a decay parameter mimic the performance of models with no decay by reducing the value of the criteria. Models with three decision criterion parameters perform disCussiOn In this article, we explored perceptual decision mak ing in a multiplealternative experimental paradigm. Our aim was to examine a range of architectural features that a model could contain and attempt to determine which were needed to fit experimental data well. Several fami lies of decision models were applied to the data from two experiments using a multiplealternative letter discrimina tion task. The models assume racing diffusion processes and represent the decision process as a stochastic accu mulation of evidence toward decision criteria. Statistical analysis of model fits allowed several model families to be eliminated.
The models that produce good fits for both experiments all share the following characteristics. First, the models use nine input strength parameters, one for each level of difficulty crossed with the number of alternatives. Each of the nine parameters is for a target input strength. The other (foil) input strengths are determined by the appro priate target input strength, because target and foil input strengths sum to 1 and foil input strengths are assumed to be equal. Second, accumulation of evidence is bounded to be nonnegative. Third, the models do not need lateral inhibition between accumulators. Fourth, the models do not need leakage in the accumulators. Note-Individual parameter estimates for bestfitting model, according to the Bayesian information criterion. Column labels match those in Table 6 , except for ρ n λ , input strength at the λ level of bias (n, neutral; l, low; h, high) for the corresponding n number of alternatives. M, mean for Participants 1-3. Model analyses of data from Experiment 2 (which ma nipulated the frequency of the target stimulus) indicate that, as in Experiment 1, the nondecisional component of processing increases with an increase in the number of alternatives. Unlike in Experiment 1, the participants used the same decision criterion for two, three, and four alternatives. Both experiments give insights into how slight changes in accuracy across number of alternatives are explained: They are natural predictions of these types of models, caused by the redistribution of weight from one to two distractor accumulators and from two to three distractor accumulators. criteria is nearly logarithmic. This is equivalent to Hick's law (cf. Equation 1) applied to a component of processing (as opposed to a measure of performance).
Our modeling analyses seem to lead to a conundrum. Should we select the bestfitting model strictly on numeri cal grounds, or may we reject the best numerical choice in favor of a model with an almost equivalent qualitative fit? For example, we prefer a model that has only one nondeci sional component as a function of number of alternatives, rather than three, in order to provide an account that is more consistent with what we know about encoding and motor response subprocesses. 6 X X X X X X X X X . Figure 17 . Quantile-probability plots for data from Participants 3 and 5 and predictions from the respective best-fitting models in Experiment 2. reaction time (rT) points are plotted in quantile ascending order, from .1 to .9. From left to right, the three columns across error responses represent high-, low-, and no-bias conditions, followed by no-, low-, and high-bias data points across correct responses. Model variant labels abbreviate the models' structures: a, accumulator (without decay); T, t er ; C, criterion; eS, equal starting point.
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rEFErEnCEs
In summary, we describe perceptual decision making using models based on the stochastic accumulation of evidence toward a criterion. We find that several families of racing diffusion process models, differing only by a few assumptions-at times, only a single assumptioncan be discriminated when fitted to the same multiple alternative data sets. Some can be eliminated outright on the bases of statistical comparison among goodnessof fit values. In the class of successful models, the mod els do not need lateral inhibition or decay in order to fit multiplealternative data well. Furthermore, we find that variability in the duration of encoding and response out put subprocesses and withintrial noise play important roles in the processing of evidence.
Some more general issues raised by this study are as follows. First, these are data from just one kind of experi mental paradigm. It could be that the winning models are specific to this and similar paradigms, or it could be that these winning models apply over the whole range of ap propriate tasks.
Second, it may seem easy to find an experimental para digm that allows comparisons across number of alterna tives. However, this is more difficult than it seems. There are problems in making sure that stimuli are equally diffi cult across number of alternatives, as well as making sure that reasonable ranges of accuracy and RTs are produced. A major issue for many choices of tasks is that partici pants might be able to adopt a strategy of, for example, first making a decision about Choices A and B, then con sidering C. Such strategies would result in a different class of model architectures.
Third, it may seem easy to generalize decision mod els from twochoice to multiplealternative paradigms (e.g., Audley & Pike, 1965, Figure 1 ; Bogacz et al., 2007; LaBerge, 1962; Laming, 1968, Figures 3.4 and 6.1; Usher & McClelland, 2001 ). However, as we have noted above, there is a large number of possible assumptions that can be made about the architecture and component processes of models, and this can lead to a large family of models to evaluate.
Fourth, this strategy of competitive model testing al lowed us to reduce the number of competitive modeling assumptions in the perceptual decision task we used. We suggest that this approach could be more generally use ful in discriminating among families of models in other multiplealternative paradigms (e.g., recognition memory discussed in Ratcliff & Starns, 2009 ) in order to arrive at the most competitive models in those paradigms.
The research we report focused on examining theoreti cal descriptions of perceptual decision making that are capable of being extended from twochoice paradigms to multiplealternative paradigms. The successful models de scribe the decision as a race toward a criterion driven by the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. In that dynamic accumulation of sensory evidence, we find that neither lateral inhibition between alternatives nor decay in evidence are necessary for decision making among mul tiple alternatives. This study also provides a case study for evaluating candidate perceptualdecisionmaking models.
2. The data from Experiment 2 contained conditions (viz., low and high bias) in which stimuli were not equally probable. For these condi tions (center and right panels under Experiment 2 in Figure 5 ), Hick's law should be expected to predict MRT only if log(n11) in Equa tion 1 were replaced by Σ n i50 p i log(1/p i ), where p i is the probability of each response choice (cf. Usher et al., 2002) . For our data, Equa tion 1 was a good enough approximation, so we used it for simplicity of exposition.
3. Individual cutoffs (lower, upper) are as follows (in milliseconds). For two, three, and four alternatives, respectively, in Experiment 1: Par ticipant 1, (240, 650), (300, 850), and (320, 950); Participant 2, (280, 600), (300, 650), (300, 650); Participant 3, (250, 1,000), (300, 1,000), (330, 1,000); Participant 4, (240, 900), (240, 1,100), (240, 1, 200) .
4. Individual cutoffs (lower, upper) are as follows (in milliseconds). 5. We find evidence to support an adjustment in the nondecisional component due to an increase in the number of alternatives. Data from the other 4 participants in an experiment in which the only manipulated variable was number of alternatives (with 7,616 observations) show that the leading edge (i.e., .1 quantile) of the correct RT distribution in creases, on average, by approximately 24 msec from two to three alterna tives and by approximately 12 msec from three to four alternatives. Even after familiarizing themselves with the stimulus-response mapping, it is plausible that participants require extra time getting set to make their decision because of their knowledge of being in a condition with more possible responses. We termed the time needed for this psychological adjustment preparation time.
6. Such a model is feasible with only one free parameter account ing for nondecision time for two alternatives and with a fixed increase from two to three and from three to four alternatives. In fitting such a model (using T er 1 Churchland, Kiani, and Shadlen (2008) . Churchland et al. used a motion discrimination task to study two and fourchoice situations and found that there might exist a neural deadline for the decision and that four alternatives require more evidence accu mulation than do two alternatives. Albantakis and Deco used a similar paradigm and found evidence for a physiological advantage of a pooled, multineuronal representation of choice alternatives. aPPEndix Low-Versus High-Frequency Targets As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, a more curious reader might wonder whether a model analysis that pitched lowfrequency versus highfrequency targets could provide extra information. We do not present such an analysis in the main text, because the conditions with lowfrequency targets (in low or highbias conditions) have considerably fewer data points than do the conditions with highfrequency targets. Thus, modeling results for lowfrequency targets alone might not be as meaningful as we would like them to be.
In the main text, we report results from an aggregate analysis, considering both low and highfrequency target responses, which, because of the discrepancy in the number of data points we highlight above, are dominated by the highfrequency responses. We fore saw that the magnitude of the effects might be amplified should we report only on the basis of highfrequency targets, for example, but we avoided that option so as not to bias our analysis. Nevertheless, Tables A1 and A2 are included here to serve as an illustration of how input strength and criterion parameters might change across the frequency of the target and how much the parameter estimates might change from the aggregate to the specific. (To produce Tables A1 and A2 , we used the bestfitting models shown in Table 9 so that a comparison would be straightforward.)
Taking the means row of Table A1 and comparing it with the means row of Table 9 , we note that the decision criterion is about 96% of the overall estimate among highfrequency targets and that the increase in input strength estimates is more prominent across all bias levels. Both observations are consistent with the participants' expectations of the highfrequency targets: Psychologically, expected targets might need to accumulate less evidence before a decision in their favor is made (although this difference is not quantitatively significant in our case), and the more a target is expected, the larger its strength to elicit an identification response.
Inspecting Table A2 in the same way and comparing its means row with the means row of Table 9 , we note that the decision cri terion is about 3% higher than the overall estimate and that input strength estimates show a decreasing trend with increase in bias toward other targets (essentially biasing participants against these lowfrequency targets). These observations are again consistent with participants' expectations of the highfrequency targets: More evidence might be required of targets that appear infrequently than of targets that appear frequently (although again, it is the case that this difference is not quantitatively significant), and the less a target is expected, the smaller its strength to elicit an identification response. Together, these two tables confirm the topdown influence on the perceptual task caused by the expectation of the stimulus, which is opposite in nature to the bottomup influence caused by the perceptual difficulty manipulation in Experiment 1. Table a1 individual Parameter Estimates in Experiment 2: High-Frequency
